U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 810 Seventh Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20531 Janet Reno Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice Daniel Marcus Acting Associate Attorney General Mary Lou Leary Acting Assistant Attorney General Noel Brennan Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alexa Verveer Deputy Assistant Attorney General C.H. "Butch" Straub, II Director, Office for Domestic Preparedness Support Andy Mitchell Deputy Director, Office for Domestic Preparedness Support Department of Justice Response Center: 1-800-421-6770 Office of Justice Programs World Wide Web Homepage: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov NCJ181200 This version of the Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit supercedes all previous versions. Effective Date: May 15, 2000 Public Reporting Burden Paperwork Reduction Act Notice. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. We try to create forms and instructions that are accurate, can be easily understood, and which impose the least possible burden to you to provide us with information. The estimated average time to complete and file your portion of this assessment is four to eight hours. If you have comments regarding the accuracy of this estimate, or suggestions for making this form simpler, you can write to the Office for Domestic Preparedness Support, 810 7th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20531. Foreword The Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs (OJP) is providing funds to States under the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program for the purchase of specialized equipment for fire, emergency medical, hazardous materials response services, and law enforcement agencies. These funds will be used to enhance the capabilities of State and local units of government to respond to acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the State agency designated to administer this program, your role in strategic planning and in assessing overall State and local capabilities is a critical component of OJP's State and local domestic preparedness initiative. Receipt of additional funds under the program will be contingent on the State's development of two separate, but related, documents. The first is a Statewide Needs Assessment, and the second is a Three-Year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy. The Needs Assessment will require each State to assess its requirements for equipment, first responder training, and other resources involved in a WMD response. This Needs Assessment will form the basis of the Statewide Strategy. The Strategy will direct how States will target grant funds received under the OJP equipment program and provide OJP a guide on how to target first responder training and other resources available through OJP's Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support. It is important to understand that the Strategy is a multi-year document and will continue to guide deployment of these resources, by the States for equipment funds, and OJP for other resources, over the next three years. To assist States in conducting their threat, risk and needs assessments, and developing their three- year strategy, OJP has developed an on-line data collection tool. This on-line tool was developed in close cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). To guide users of the on-line tool, OJP is providing this Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit. The intent of the Took Kit is to provide users with a step-by-step guide to which they can refer when the on-line tool becomes available. States may begin registering users for the on-line data collection tool beginning July 5, 2000, in the first phase of this process. OJP will implement the second phase of the data collection process on August 1, 2000. At that time, software will be made available on-line for local jurisdiction data input. State agencies will be able to input data beginning August 15, 2000, when the third phase of the on-line process is implemented. Instructions for electronic submission of the data and statewide strategies using the world wide web can be found on OJP's web page at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp. I look forward to working with you and your colleagues during the implementation of this program to enhance State and local emergency response capabilities in preparation for an event that will hopefully never take place. Sincerely, C.H. "Butch" Straub II Director Office for Domestic Preparedness Support ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT TOOL KIT TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Section 1 Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit Introduction 1 Section 2 Risk Assessment Process 4 Tab a. Task A: Vulnerability Assessment 5 Appendix: Potential Targets 15 Tab b. Task B: Threat Assessment 16 Tab c. Task C: Public Health Assessment 31 Tab d. Task D: Integration of Vulnerability/Threat/Public Health 58 Section 3 Capabilities and Needs Assessment 63 Tab a. Sample Operational Capabilities for Emergency Responders 71 Tab b. OJP Capability TIER Levels 72 Tab c. Tier Level Competency Information 74 Tab d. Compendium of Federally Conducted WMD Courses 75 Section 4 Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix 80 Section 5 Three-year Projection Forms 81 Tab a. Three-year Projection - Equipment 82 Tab b. Three-year Projection - Training 85 Tab c. Three-year Projection - Exercises 88 Tab d. Technical Assistance Projections 91 Section 6 Additional Training Information 93 Section 7 Emergency Response Team Survey 94 Section 8 Recommendations for State and Local Response to WMD Terrorism Incidents 97 Section 9 Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy 98 Tab a. Three-Year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy 99 Tab b. Three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy Matrix 100 Glossary and Acronyms 101 Section 1 Assessment and Strategy Tool Kit Introduction A Program Guidelines and Application Kit was provided to each state's designated administrative agency for the Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program during February 2000. These guidelines and materials included an Appendix C, "Guidance for Conducting a Needs Assessment and Developing a Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy." This guidance specified that the conduct of a Needs Assessment, followed by the development of a three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy were conditions of the state's acceptance of grant funds under the FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program. Additionally, this guidance indicated that OJP/ODP developed assessment and strategy tools, detailed guidance and forms to be provided in a subsequent mailing. Accordingly, this document, Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit for the FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program is provided for each of the designated state administrative agencies (SAA) to assist and guide their assessment conduct and strategy development. This document will be available online and may be accessed at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/fundopps.htm. Please note that the version mailed to you is for planning purposes only and that none of the forms therein may be used for submitting information. All information submitted pursuant to satisfaction of assessment and strategy requirements must be submitted electronically and forms downloaded from the Web version of the Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit. It was augmented by OJP/ODP regional workshops held in April, 2000 for the SAAs and by the availability of extended direct technical assistance. The tool kit contains eight separate sections following the introduction which combined with an additional task from Appendix C of the Program Guidelines and Application Kit represent sequential steps/tasks which each SAA should conduct and complete in order to satisfy the assessment and strategy conditions of its acceptance of grant funds under the program. A summary of each of these sections/steps along with a brief commentary on its relationship to other tasks follows: Step/Task 1 (Appendix C, Items IIIA and IIIB, Program Guidelines and Application Kit): Identification and Coordination of Jurisdictions. Prior to conducting the work tasks detailed in each section of the Assessment and Strategy Tool Kit, each SAA should take actions to comply with IIIA and IIIB of Appendix C in the Guidelines and Application Kit. Item IIIA specifies the identification of jurisdictions and item IIIB specifies the particulars of coordination among program areas, response disciplines, and levels of government. The SAA is responsible for assuring that its assessment and strategy represent the entire state and all programs, response disciplines, and levels of government involved in domestic preparedness within the borders of the state. Only subsequent to initiating and completing the task of jurisdiction identification and to initiating the task of coordination, should SAAs begin work on tasks covered in the various sections of the Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit. Step/Task 2 (Section 2): Risk Assessment Process includes instruments developed by the FBI and the CDC to evaluate and integrate vulnerability, threat, and public health performance and yield a risk profile. This assessment is to be conducted for each identified jurisdiction within the state. The results of these assessments combined with the results of the Capabilities and Needs Assessment at Section 3 will allow the SAA to complete the Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix at Section 4. Additionally, the results should be directly and indirectly useful in completing tasks in Sections 3, 5, 7, 8, and especially in completion of the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy at Section 9. Step/Task 3 (Section 3): Capabilities and Needs Assessment is designed to provide operational capability information and guide identification of program needs. This assessment is to be conducted for each identified jurisdiction within the state. The results of these assessments combined with results of the Risk Assessment process at Section 2 will allow the SAA to complete the Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix at Section 4. The results of these assessments also should be directly or indirectly useful in completing tasks in Sections 5, 7, 8, and 9. Results are of particular importance for tasks at Sections 5, 8, and 9. Step/Task 4 (Section 4): Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix is a form for priority ranking of each of the state's identified jurisdictions based on Task 1 (Section 2), Risk Assessment Process and Task 2 (Section 3), Capabilities and Needs Assessment. One matrix for each state is to be completed by the SAA. The prioritization should be reflected in tasks related to completion of the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy at Sections 9. Step/Task 5 (Section 5): Three-year Projection Forms are designed to report existing resources/efforts and projected needs for each response discipline within each domestic preparedness program area. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Following completion of jurisdiction forms, the SAA is to complete roll up forms providing a statewide summary of each response discipline's resources, efforts, and needs within each domestic preparedness program area. The results of Section 3 work should be helpful in this effort and the results of Section 5 will be instrumental in completion of tasks at Sections 8 and 9. Step/Task 6 (Section 6): Additional Training Information. This form is designed to report information about domestic preparedness training capacity and needs. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Information from these forms should be combined with information on state assets and "rolled-up" into one statewide summary form by the SAA. Information from this form should be reflected in the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy at Section 9. Step/Task 7 (Section 7): Emergency Response Team Survey. This form is designed to report the number and composition of emergency response teams within the state. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Information from these forms should be combined with information on state assets and "rolled-up" into one statewide summary form by the SAA. Information from this form should be reflected in the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy covered at Section 9. Step/Task 8 (Section 8): Recommendations for State and Local Response to WMD Terrorism Incidents. This form is designed to report recommendations regarding overall domestic preparedness efforts within the jurisdiction and state. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Information from these forms should be combined with state-level recommendations and "rolled-up" into one statewide summary by the SAA. Information from the state roll-up should be reflected in the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy covered at Section 9. Step/Task 9 (Section 9): Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy. This section provides an outline, guidance, and forms to assist completion of the statewide strategy. One statewide strategy representing all jurisdictions, domestic preparedness programs, and responder disciplines is to be completed by the SAA based on all work tasks, forms, and guidance covered at Sections 2 through 8. The conduct of Needs Assessments and the development of Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategies represents a thorough nationwide planning process designed to fill critical gaps in this country's knowledge about domestic preparedness and to better guide Federal efforts aimed at building domestic preparedness capacity through development of a sound, fully informed, national domestic preparedness strategy. The Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit combined with OJP/ODP regional workshops and the availability of extended direct technical assistance should function to minimize potential difficulties that may be encountered by states in conducting assessments and developing statewide strategies. Section 2 Risk Assessment Process Overview: The United States government has initiated numerous programs aimed at improving our domestic preparedness against potential terrorist attacks involving WMD. A fundamental comment made by numerous government agencies reviewing these programs is that most can improve the effectiveness of their equipment, training and exercise programs if a needs assessment process is employed to help prioritize efforts. The following four tasks of this document are intended to provide a process to conduct assessments prior to establishment of program priorities aimed at improving jurisdictional domestic preparedness. Tasks A, B, C and D are designed to provide the jurisdictions with a methodology and the supporting tools to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment (a combination of threat, vulnerability, and public health). The risk assessment is designed to provide the necessary evaluation information to establish priorities for the jurisdiction that will improve response capabilities to WMD terrorism incidents. Section 2, Tab a Task A: Vulnerability Assessment For: All local jurisdictions participating in the OJP FY99 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program. Overview: This vulnerability assessment is needed to benchmark the local jurisdiction's current vulnerability profile with regard to a WMD terrorism incident as stated in the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program. This assessment is to be retained by the jurisdiction and is not intended for submission to the state. Assumptions: There are two key assumptions that should be used as you proceed through the Jurisdiction Vulnerability Assessment process. They are:  Use the concept of the "most likely scenario" occurring in your jurisdiction when completing the vulnerability assessments for each vulnerability assessment factor. The most likely scenario is one that is not the worst case but represents the most probable kind of WMD event that may occur in your jurisdiction based upon the unique infrastructure and their attractiveness to any potential terrorist elements or individuals as a lucrative target to attack.  An attack against such a target (facility, site, system, or special event) within your jurisdiction would produce death, injuries, or infrastructure damage that would overwhelm the jurisdiction's emergency response capabilities including any mutual aid agreements/assistance pacts. Jurisdictional Vulnerability Assessment The following diagram and four listed steps provide general directions for completion of the jurisdiction Vulnerability Assessment. Figure 2-1 STEP I - Formation of the Planning Team Assembling the Planning Team: The first step is to assemble the jurisdiction planning team that will have a working knowledge of the presence of the following categories of facilities, sites, systems, and/or special events within your jurisdiction: Government Services Transportation Centers Electric Power, Oil/Gas Storage Water Supply Information/Communications Banking and Finance Emergency Services Public Health Institutions Recreational Facilities Commercial/Industrial Facilities Miscellaneous It is recommended that the planning team represent law enforcement, fire services, EMS, HazMat, public works, public health services, and emergency management at the local, state, and Federal levels that would be affected or respond to an act of terrorism within a jurisdiction. STEP II Compile a list of the "most important" facilities, sites, systems, or special event activities that are present or take place within the jurisdiction. Develop an all inclusive list of potential targets using the seven general categories of facilities, sites, systems, and special events. A list of potential targets is located at the appendix (found on page 15) to this task. Using the initial all inclusive list, develop a priority list that will represent only the highest priority or most critical facilities, sites, systems, or special events located or taking place within your jurisdiction. Example: If you have 100 facilities within your jurisdiction select ten (10% of 100) of them to appear on your priority list of the most important. If you have less than ten potential targets within your jurisdiction, it is recommended that you assess all of them. A facility, site, system, or special event selected for the priority list should meet the following criteria: A facility, site, system, or venue within the jurisdiction that in the wake of a WMD incident would result in any or all of the following:  Large numbers of death and injuries  Extensive damage or destruction of facilities that provide or sustain human needs, i.e., power sources, food distribution sites, essential public services, or  Causes long-term catastrophic consequences to the general local economic well being of the community. The planning team is now prepared to conduct an assessment of the vulnerability of these facilities, sites, systems, and special events to possible WMD terrorism incidents according to the factors presented in STEP III. STEP III - Conducting the Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment The Seven Vulnerability Assessment Factors: The planning team may use the following seven factors to assess the vulnerability of each individual site listed on your jurisdictional priority list: Level of Visibility Criticality of Target Site Value of Target to Potential Threat Element (PTE) Potential Threat Element (PTE) Access to the Target Threat of Hazard Potential for Collateral Mass Casualty Site Population Capacity The seven factors, their definitions, and associated rating are listed later in this section. Use them as a reference sheet for completing the Vulnerability Assessment Worksheets. Complete a Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet for each individual critical target on your priority list of potential targets according to the following instructions: Note: Copy the worksheet for each vulnerability assessment performed. Note: This assessment is based upon the planning team's overall qualitative judgment of each factor. It is not a definitive quantitative assessment.  Using the Vulnerability Assessment Factors (found starting on page 9), select the rating value that most closely represents the facility, infrastructure, event, etc., for each of the seven vulnerability assessment factors.  Record these ratings in Table 2-a-1 of the Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet for each factor assessed. Be sure to provide the information requested at the top of the worksheet.  Total the score for the seven rating factors values at the bottom of Table 2-a-1 at the Total Score box.  Compare the Total Score of this potential target with the scale provided in the left column of the Assessment Key at Table 2-a-2.  Match the Target Vulnerability Rating listed in the right column of the Assessment Key that falls within the numeric range of your Total Score.  Record this Target Vulnerability Rating in the Individual Target Vulnerability Rating box at Table 2-a-3.  Repeat the above steps until all facilities, infrastructure, events, etc, (priority target list) you selected (10% - most important) have been assessed.  After completing all of your Individual Target Vulnerability Assessments record the Individual Target Vulnerability Ratings on the Jurisdictional Individual Vulnerability Summary at Table 2-a-4. STEP IV Determine the Jurisdictional Vulnerability Enter the highest Individual Target Vulnerability Rating found in Table 2-a-4 into Table 2-a-5. This is your Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating. Also record this information on Table 2-d-2, Section 2, Tab d, Task D: Risk Assessment. Legal WMD (BNICE) Hazard Environment: Enter the total number of sites (as described below) within the jurisdiction in each classification into Table 2-a-6. Also record this information on Table 2-d-4, Section 2, Tab d, Task D: Risk Assessment. 2. Biological Hazardous sites which transfer or receive selected agents listed in 42 CFR Part 72. 3. Chemical Hazardous sites which contain Tier II chemicals in either Title 40 or Title 49 CFR. 4. Incendiary/Explosive Hazardous sites which manufacture, produce, or store in reportable quantities incendiary and/or explosive materials as delineated in Title 18, USC and 27 CFR 55. 5. Nuclear/Radiological Hazardous sites which contain radiological sources as described in 10 CFR 36 (Irradiators), 10 CFR 50 (Production and Utilization Facilities), 10 CFR 70 (Special Nuclear Material), DOE critical facilities, and any other nuclear storage sites. Note: The Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet(s) and the Individual Target Vulnerability Summary are to be retained by the jurisdiction. Note: The Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet is marked "For Official Use Only." The planning team should limit its distribution only to those government and private sector officials taking part in this process or who have a professional need to know. Note: BNICE is an acronym for Biological, Nuclear/Radiological, Incendiary, Chemical, Explosive agents. Vulnerability Assessment Factors 1) Level of Visibility Level of Visibility Rating Value Addresses the awareness of the existence and visibility of the target. Invisible Classified Location 0 Very Low Visibility Probably not aware of its existence 1 Low Visibility Probably not well known existence 2 Medium Visibility Existence is probably known 3 High Visibility Existence well known 4 Very High Visibility Existence is obvious 5 2) Criticality of Target Site to Jurisdiction Criticality of Target Site Rating Value Usefulness of assets to population, economy, government, etc. Deemed critical to the continuity of basic jurisdiction infrastructure. (Utilities, communications, water, gas, sewage, electrical, petroleum, transportation, medical facility, government facilities, hampers emergency response) No Usefulness 0 Minor Usefulness 1 Moderate Usefulness 2 Significant Usefulness 3 Highly Useful 4 Critical 5 3) Value of Target to PTE Value of Target Rating Value Evaluates value of the target to serve the ends of the PTEs identified in the Threat Assessment based on Motivations. None 0 Very Low 1 Low 2 Medium 3 High 4 Very High 5 Vulnerability Assessment Factors (Continued) 4) PTE Access to Target PTE Access to Target Rating Value Addresses the availability of the target for ingress and egress by a PTE. Fenced, Guarded, Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access by Pass Only, No Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet 0 Guarded, Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access of Visitors and Non-Staff Personnel, No Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet 1 Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access of Visitors and Non- Staff Personnel, No Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet 2 Controlled Access of Visitors, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, No Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet 3 Open Access to all personnel, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, No Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet 4 Open Access to all personnel, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, Vehicle Parking within 50 feet 5 5) Target Threat of Hazard Target Threat of Hazard Rating Value This assesses the presence of WMD Materials (BNICE) in quantities that would expend internal response capabilities if released. No WMD materials present 0 WMD materials present in moderate quantities, under positive control, and in secured locations. 1 WMD materials present in moderate quantities and controlled. 2 Major concentrations of WMD materials that have established control features and are secured in the site. 3 Major concentrations of WMD materials that have moderate control features. 4 Major concentrations of WMD materials that are accessible to Non-staff personnel. 5 Vulnerability Assessment Factors (Continued) 6) Site Population Capacity Site Population Capacity Rating Value Maximum number of individuals at a site at any given time. 0 0 1 250 1 251 500 2 501 - 1000 3 1001 5000 4 > 5000 5 7) Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties Rating Value Addresses potential collateral mass casualties within a one-mile radius of the target site. Number ranges indicate inhabitants within a one-mile radius of the site. 0 to 100 0 101 to 500 1 501 to 1000 2 1001 to 2000 3 2001 to 5000 4 > 5000 5 For Official Use Only Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Values Factor Score Visibility Criticality Value Access Threat of Hazard Site Population Collateral Mass Casualties Total Score Table 2-a-1 Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Key TOTAL SCORE TARGET VULNERABILITY RATING 0-2 1 3-5 2 6-8 3 9-11 4 12-14 5 15-17 6 18-20 7 21-23 8 24-26 9 27-29 10 30-32 11 33-35 12 Table 2-a-2 Individual Target Vulnerability Rating Table 2-a-3 Note: Copy this worksheet to use in evaluating each selected individual target. For Official Use Only Individual Target Vulnerability Summary The following summary form is provided to consolidate the list of potential targets evaluated. The ranking indicates, from highest to lowest, the Individual Target Vulnerability Ratings from the Individual Target Assessments conducted. Ranking Potential Target Name Individual Target Vulnerability Rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Table 2-a-4 Instructions: The overall "Jurisdiction Vulnerability Level" is the highest Individual Target Vulnerability Rating assessed. Use the highest rated Potential Target listed on the Individual Target Vulnerability Summary at Table 2-a-4, record this information below in Table 2-a-5. Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating ______________ (highest rating recorded on Table 2-a-4) Table 2-a-5 Legal WMD (BNICE) Hazard Environment Hazard Total number of hazardous sites located in jurisdiction Biological (Infectious Only) Chemical (Tier II) Incendiary & Explosive Nuclear & Radiological Total Table 2-a-6 Appendix to Section 2, Tab a Potential Targets Continuity of Government Services Government office buildings/Courthouses Military installations (including reserve components) Embassies /consulates Transportation Railheads /rail yards Seaports/river ports Interstate highways Bus terminals Tunnels Bridges Subways Ferries Airports Truck terminals Oil pipelines Gas pipelines . Electric Power, Oil/Gas Storage Electric power production Electric power distribution Gas storage and shipment Petroleum storage and shipment Telecommunications Water Supply Water supply plants Water purification systems Water distribution systems Wastewater plants Banking and Finance Banks Financial institutions Information and Communications Newspapers Radio stations TV broadcast facilities Trunking stations for communications / switching / CATV Public Health Hospitals Emergency medical centers Emergency Services * Law emergency services Fire emergency services State / local Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) Emergency responder stations Emergency Medical Services Recreational Facilities ** Sports arenas / stadiums Auditoriums Theaters Parks Casinos Concert halls / pavilions Restaurants frequented by a target population Institutions ** Science research facilities Academic institutions Museums Schools Commercial / Industrial Facilities ** Chemical plants Industrial plants Petroleum plants Business / corporate centers Malls / shopping centers Hotels / convention centers Apartment buildings Miscellaneous ** Special events Parades Religious services Festivals Celebrations Scenic tours Abortion clinics Agriculture Note: Examples are not exhaustive. Local jurisdictional criteria should be added as required. Categories are from PDD 63 with the following notes. * Combined PDD 63 Categories for Fire and Law. ** Additional categories to those listed in PDD 63. Section 2, Tab b Task B: Threat Assessment A. Assessment Overview For: All local jurisdictions participating in the OJP-FY99 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program. Purpose: In June 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive-39 (PDD-39) which reaffirmed the FBI's lead law enforcement and crisis management role in the U.S. Government's response to domestic terrorism. In May, 1998, the President signed PDD-62 which charged the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as lead agency for Federal operational response to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident. Pursuant to both of these directives, the FBI is continuing to increase its involvement with state, local and Federal agencies who have both a crisis and consequence response role in responding to a WMD threat or incident. To address domestic terrorism prevention, response, and recovery efforts, it is necessary to assess the risk, capabilities, and ultimate needs of the state and local response to a terrorist incident. This assessment process is the first step in ensuring nationwide preparedness. The DOJ, through the OJP and FBI, has taken the lead in providing this assessment as mandated by the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998, and as stated in the OJP FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program. This WMD Terrorist Jurisdiction Threat Assessment has been developed as one portion of a larger vulnerability and risk assessment. The entire process is intended to serve as a benchmark establishing the local jurisdiction's current risk profile as it pertains to a domestic WMD terrorism incident. The comparison of local risk and existing capabilities profiles may be used by the jurisdictions to identify and prioritize needs. Objective: The following is a list of objectives of the assessment process. · Promote interagency collaboration/coordination of criminal investigative intelligence information relating to WMD terrorism. · Assess the threat to particular targets, enabling a jurisdiction to better focus its prevention and preparedness efforts, and also to enhance response capabilities. · Identify the types of weapons of mass destruction likely to be produced and/or developed by the existing potential threats to better identify equipment and training needs necessary to respond to the particular types of hazards. Direction: This assessment is to be completed by jurisdictions in coordination with the designated state agency for the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program. Should the jurisdiction require assistance completing the assessment, it should coordinate with the designated state agency. It is recommended that the jurisdiction identify other pertinent local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the assessment process. Once completed, the local jurisdiction must return the Jurisdiction Threat Profile to the designated state agency [also known as the State Administrative Agency (SAA). The SAA will then forward the completed profile to OJP. B. Introduction Terrorist events such as the World Trade Center bombing, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, and the pipe bomb detonated at the Olympic Games in Atlanta revealed the United States' increased susceptibility to terrorist assaults. These attacks, coupled with the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack, where the weapon was the chemical nerve agent sarin, exposed the threat of use of WMD within the United States. The United States is also experiencing an increased number of hoaxes involving the use of chemical or biological agents perpetrated by individuals wishing to instill fear and disrupt communities. While a conventional attack using bombs/explosive devices has been the weapon of choice domestically, yesterday's bomb threat may be replaced with a potential for more exotic biological or chemical threats. WMD cases, primarily those dealing with the threatened use or procurement of chemical and biological materials, have steadily increased as depicted in the following chart (*Data for 1999 through November 30, 1999; Source-FBI WMDOU): Figure 2-2 With the threat of domestic WMD terrorist attacks on the rise, there is validity in evaluating jurisdiction threat data to better identify potential terrorist targets and likely WMD hazards. This information, coupled with target vulnerability analysis, is the most comprehensive means by which to evaluate the risk of a WMD terrorist act. The risk to a jurisdiction is then measured against present capabilities to determine a jurisdiction's needs. Although threat information is deemed beneficial to the needs assessment process, it should not be given undue weight. There remains insufficient empirical data on domestic terrorist activity to suggest a pattern of particular targeting of a specific region or city. Furthermore, threat conditions are dynamic, limiting accurate threat analysis to a specific moment in time. Henceforth, it must be recognized that the identification of a particular threat is not an absolute predictor that a terrorist incident will occur. Nor should the absence of an identified threat be construed as meaning that a terrorist incident is less likely to occur. Nonetheless, the FBI believes that efforts to identify and analyze potential threats at the local jurisdiction level is essential to the overall assessment process and promotes necessary interagency collaboration of criminal investigative intelligence information relating to WMD terrorism. The OJP Integrated Assessment Tool is not intended to take the place of traditional threat and vulnerability analysis utilized by intelligence and law enforcement communities in efforts to prevent, deter, and resolve acts of domestic terrorism. Traditional threat and vulnerability analysis is far more comprehensive. In contrast, the OJP assessment process provides a simple methodology to assist states in prioritizing program investments. The OJP Integrated Assessment Tool provides a general profile of the threat, vulnerability, and risk environments of a jurisdiction, and is not to be considered an investigative tool for law enforcement purposes. C. Definitions For the purposes of this assessment the following definitions apply: Domestic Terrorism: The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico, without foreign direction, and whose acts are directed at elements of the U.S. Government or its population, in the furtherance of political or social goals. International Terrorism: The unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual who has some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend national boundaries against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Potential Threat Element (PTE): Any group or individual in which there are allegations or information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the utilization of a Weapon of Mass Destruction, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature. Note: This definition provides sufficient predicate for the FBI to initiate an investigation. Weapons of Mass Destruction (Title 18 USC Section 2332a): (1) Any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; or radiation or radioactivity; (2)(A) Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, or a missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one quarter ounce, or mine or device similar to the above; (B) poison gas; (C) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. D. Assessment Process The Jurisdiction Threat Assessment is designed to accomplish several goals, all using a process that encourages open lines of communication between Federal, state, and local agencies involved in public safety. The assessment utilizes a pre-existing Department of Defense (DOD) terrorist threat analysis methodology to first identify and evaluate the threat level of each potential threat element (PTE) identified in your jurisdiction. This methodology has been revised to meet the requirements of this assessment process. The threat level of an existing PTE is determined on the basis of its past violent history; intentions to commit a WMD act of terrorism; the capability to carry out a WMD act of terrorism; and any targeting efforts aimed at achieving the specific terrorist act. Each factor is considered when assessing the potential for violent or destructive activity emanating from a terrorist group. However, the accuracy of such analysis is dependent on the availability of intelligence-related information concerning a particular individual or group. Small groups and rogue individuals, whose activities are difficult to anticipate due to limited or nonexistent intelligence information, represent an unpredictable but constant threat. Threat Factors Defined: Provided for purposes of consistency are the definitions to be applied for each threat factor: Existence: The presence of a group or individual, operating within the jurisdiction in which there are allegations or information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the utilization of a WMD, against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature. History: Demonstrated past terrorist activity over time or a recorded, violent criminal history. Intentions: Credible advocacy/threats of force or violence, or acts, or preparations to act, evidencing the intent to create a WMD, or to carry out a plan to release a WMD, or to participate in a WMD incident. Capability: Credible information that a specific PTE possesses the requisite training, skills, financial means, and access to resources necessary to develop, produce, or acquire a particular type of WMD in a quantity and/or potency sufficient to produce mass casualties, combined with information substantiating the PTE's ability to safely store, test, and deliver the same. All these factors must be met before a group or individual can be justified as possessing the requisite capability necessary to implement a WMD attack. Targeting: Credible information indicative of preparations for specific terrorist operations against identifiable targets within the subject jurisdiction. (Ex. Obtaining of specific floor plans of a target location or surveillance activities, etc.) Calculation of the PTE Threat Level: Each factor is assigned a corresponding numerical value based on the factor's perceived significance. The threat level is quantified by adding up the values of all existing threat factors for each PTE. A PTE's threat level may range from a low of 1 to a high of 10. Below is a list of the threat factors and the corresponding point value: THREAT FACTOR VALUES THREAT FACTOR VALUE Existence 1 History 1 Intentions 2 Capability 2 Targeting 4 Table 2-b-1 If the information known to the assessment group does not satisfy the parameters set forth in the definition of any one factor, or the information is not credible, then that factor cannot be included in the valuation process. Examples are charted below: EXAMPLE THREAT LEVEL ASSESSMENT Identity of PTE Existence (1) Violent History (1) Intentions (2) WMD Capability (2) Targeting (4) PTE THREAT LEVEL Example 1 1 1 Example 2 1 2 3 Example 3 1 2 2 4 9 Example 4 1 1 2 4 Example 5 1 1 2 2 4 10 X = FACTORS FOUND TO BE PRESENT Table 2-b-2 To achieve the minimum measurable threat level, a jurisdiction must find that a PTE "exists" within the context of the required definition. This definition of the PTE was designed to correlate with the FBI's definitional threshold required to initiate a criminal investigation. Compared to the large number of jurisdictions covered in this assessment, the number of current FBI WMD terrorist investigations where PTEs have been identified is relatively low. Past threat incidents, where resolution resulted in the cessation of PTE should not be included in this portion of the threat level assessment. The threat assessment requires the current "existence" of PTEs operating within the assessing jurisdiction. Past WMD terrorist threat incidents are addressed separately. The Threat Assessment Working Group should further note that if a threat level of "5" or above is achieved for any PTE, the situation may likely require immediate action by law enforcement agencies and/or the emergency response community. This is because the capability to produce or develop a WMD and the intent to implement a WMD terrorist act has been established. The threat increases in significance when the PTE is deemed to possess the capability and the requisite intent to carry out a WMD attack. If the existence of a WMD is confirmed or intelligence and circumstances indicate a high probability that a device exists, the threat has developed into a WMD incident as defined in the Federal Response Plan. This requires an immediate response to identify, acquire, and plan the use of Federal assistance to state and local authorities in response to the potential consequences of the terrorist use or employment of the WMD. Therefore, timely notification and coordination with the FBI is essential. PTE Target Evaluation: Recognizing the motivation(s) of the PTEs will enable the assessment working group to more accurately assess the relative threats to specific and/or general categories of jurisdiction targets. For purposes of this assessment, five general motivator categories have been established, along with types of targets historically associated with each motivator. This list is provided as a general guide and is in no way is meant to limit the identification of other targets that the assessment group may deem equally critical: Motivator Examples of Likely Targets Political Anything perceived as a symbol or integral part of the governing establishment (government buildings, courthouses, revenue service, political events, campaigns) Religious Anything perceived as a symbol of, acting contrary to, or in support of group or individual religious beliefs (banks, newspaper companies, Planned Parenthood facilities, large public venues, etc.) Racial Social and legal entities that promote equality among races Environmental Organizations or facilities that are perceived to be damaging to the environment (logging industry, nuclear power plants, dams, etc.) Special Interest Organizations or entities perceived to be acting contrary to the interest of the PTE (animal rights, anti-technology, etc.) Table 2-b-3 PTE Weapon Evaluation: For purposes of this assessment, "Weapons of Mass Destruction" have been broken down into five distinct categories, i.e. biological, nuclear/radiological, incendiary, chemical, and explosive devices. Matching a PTE's threat level with the PTE's assessed capability to carry out a terrorist attack while employing one or more types of WMD is a necessary step in predicting which WMD(s) will be of most concern to a given jurisdiction. Historical Data: Past threat incidents, where resolution resulted in the cessation of PTE operations, or incidents that were later determined to be hoaxes, are important factors when assessing the needs of a given jurisdiction. Areas that have experienced a higher than average number of threat incidents where assets were expended in response to these events should be recognized. Therefore, this information is collected as part of the jurisdiction's threat and risk assessment profiles. E. Assessment Instructions [STEP ONE] Formation of the Threat Assessment Working Group: The first step is to assemble a Threat Assessment Working Group. The key is to review and evaluate threat information known to other Federal, state, and local organizations that possess such information. If your jurisdiction is a member of a FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force or a Joint Terrorism Working Group, this would be the appropriate venue for the assessment process, especially in light of the pre-clearance to review sensitive information and the FBI's participation in each group. If no Joint Terrorism Task Force or Joint Terrorism Working Group exists in your jurisdiction, coordinate your efforts with the FBI WMD coordinator(s) assigned to your jurisdiction. Federal, state and local jurisdictions need to share and compare information on a continuing basis during and well after the completion of this assessment. The FBI WMD coordinators, having been briefed on this process, stand ready to assist and will review the assessments to ensure that they are consistent with any intelligence known at the Federal level. However, the FBI WMD coordinators may or may not be in a position to physically participate in the assessment process at each jurisdiction level. If no FBI representation is readily available in your jurisdiction, look to a member of your law enforcement community to gather officials of other law enforcement agencies to participate in the assessment process. In other areas there are existing criminal intelligence consortiums that can be used for comparison and validation. There is much valuable, unclassified information that will benefit the assessment on the Internet, in publications, and in the media. As this information will be of a sensitive nature, it is suggested that only individuals privy to such information as a part of their routine responsibilities be allowed to participate. It must also be recognized that legal and operational constraints associated with the collection and sharing of certain criminal intelligence information exists. Therefore, it is understood that situations will occur where ongoing investigations cannot be disclosed. It is further understood that for purposes of avoiding any legal issues, certain restrictions do apply. In order to protect the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive intelligence information on specific groups or individuals, and in order to comply with certain legal principles and privacy laws circumscribing the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of intelligence on individuals or groups who may be identified as a PTE, no specific identity of the PTEs evaluated in the assessment process will be included in the information forwarded to the designated state agency. Since this process is focused on determining training and equipment needs and is not intended as an intelligence-gathering tool, such information is not necessary to the process. However, for audit purposes, a jurisdiction should be prepared to justify its responses. After this information is submitted to the designated state agency, FBI WMD coordinators assigned to the state will review the rolled-up data for consistency with existing information files. [STEP TWO] Complete the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet (PART F): The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet (PART F) is to be completed by the assessment working group. Record all relevant information onto the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet will be used to complete the Jurisdiction Threat Profile (PART G). The Jurisdiction Threat Profile is the only portion of the threat assessment to be forwarded to the designated state agency. Dissemination of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet is restricted in order to protect the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive intelligence information, and in order to comply with certain legal principles and privacy laws circumscribing the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of intelligence on individuals or groups who may be identified as a potential threat element (PTE), as defined in Part C of this document. [STEP THREE] Complete the Jurisdiction Threat Profile (PART G): The Jurisdiction Threat Profile (PART G) will constitute the returnable portion of the assessment to the designated state agency. Begin the Jurisdiction Threat Profile by answering the preliminary questionnaire. Thereafter, utilize the information recorded on the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet, Table 2-b-4, to complete Tables 2-b-7 through 2-b-8 of the profile. Once the profile is complete, return it to your assessment coordinator. Retain a copy for your records. [STEP FOUR] Complete the Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Profile: Submit the Threat Assessment Profile (Part G) to the jurisdiction for integration into the Risk Assessment Profile. F. JURISDICTION THREAT WORKSHEET Task I: Identify no more than 15 PTEs operating in your jurisdiction. It is important to note that the number of PTEs identified does not affect the jurisdiction's risk factor. Only the PTE with the highest threat level is considered in the risk factor equation. Follow the instructions below to complete the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. A. EVALUATE THE PRESENCE OF EACH THREAT FACTOR: Evaluate each threat factor (Existence, Capability, Intentions, History, and Targeting) attributable to each PTE identified in your jurisdiction. For each PTE, identify the threat factor(s) whose presence has been established, and record the corresponding numerical value in the appropriate threat factor column to the right of the PTE on the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet (examples are provided). The assessment working group should only consider factors where information concerning the PTE has satisfied the definitional standards of the threat factors previously set forth in this assessment. If the intelligence information does not meet those standards or the information is not deemed credible, then the respective threat factor cannot be justified to exist and must be left blank. B. CALCULATE THE THREAT LEVEL OF EACH PTE: Add the corresponding point values of each threat factor whose presence has been established and insert the value in the "Threat Level" column for each PTE. The corresponding point values are listed under each threat factor at the top of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. Threat levels may range from one to ten. C. IDENTIFY THE MOTIVATION(S) OF EACH PTE: If one or more motivators are established for a PTE, list the particular motivator(s) associated with the corresponding PTE under the "Motivation" column in the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. D. IDENTIFY THE WMD CAPABILITY OF EACH PTE: For each PTE assessed to have the capability to produce or develop a WMD, identify the particular type(s) of WMD. List these WMD types in the far right column of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. List only capabilities that have been substantiated. The mere threat to utilize a WMD of a certain type, or an assertion that the capability exists is not sufficient. The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet is not for dissemination outside the assessing jurisdiction. Identities of the PTEs are for law enforcement purposes only and should not be shared outside of the Threat Assessment Working Group. THREAT FACTORS Threat Level (1-10) Motivation P=Political R=Religious E=Environmental Ra=Racial S=Special Interest Choose one or more WMD Categories B=Biological N=Nuclear/ Radiological I=Incendiary C=Chemical E=Explosive U=Unknown Choose one or more PTE Existence (1) Violent History (1) Intentions (2) WMD Capability (2) Targeting (4) Ex. ABC Group 1 2 3 S=Anti- Tobacco U Ex. DEF Group 1 1 2 4 E C/E/I 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Table 2-b-4 The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet is not for dissemination outside the assessing jurisdiction. Identities of the PTEs are for law enforcement purposes only and should not be shared outside of the Threat Assessment Working Group. Task II: Complete the WMD Threat/Incident History Table C. List the number of terrorism-related threat incidents, by WMD category, that occurred in your jurisdiction since January 1, 1998, which resulted in the activation of emergency response assets. D. List the number of incidents (derived from "a") that were subsequently determined to be hoaxes. Note: The Threat Assessment Working Group should share this information with the planning group to ensure that this information is correct from both the crisis and consequence responder perspective. This information should also be included as part of the Jurisdiction Risk Profile. WMD Threat/Incident History (January 1, 1998 to present) Threatened WMD Hazard Total Number of Terrorist Threat Incidents Number of Terrorist Threat Incidents Determined to be Hoaxes Biological Nuclear/Radiological Incendiary Chemical Explosive Total # Table 2-b-5 Use information collected in Tasks I and II above to complete the Jurisdiction Threat Profile, Paragraph G. G. JURISDICTION THREAT PROFILE To be forwarded to the designated state agency 1) PRELIMINARY INFORMATION State: _____________________ Jurisdiction of the Threat Assessment Working Group: ___________________________ Population of Jurisdiction: ________________ Coordinating Agency: City Police County Sheriff/Police State Police/Patrol Other ____________________________ Point of Contact (POC) for the Threat Assessment Working Group Name of POC: __________________________________ Agency of POC: ________________________________ POC Telephone Number : _________________________ POC E-Mail Address:_____________________________ List All Agencies Represented within the Threat Assessment Working Group _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ _________________________ What FBI Field Division serves your jurisdiction? _____________________________ Does your jurisdiction participate in a Joint Terrorism Task Force - if so which? _______________________ G. JURISDICTION THREAT PROFILE (Cont.) 2) NUMBER OF PTEs ASSESSED Using information in Table 2-b-4 of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet, list the total number of PTEs assessed in your jurisdiction. Total Number of PTEs Table 2-b-6 3) EXISTING CAPABILITIES Designate the types of WMD capabilities assessed to exist in the jurisdiction (Table 2-b-4): None Incendiary Biological Chemical Nuclear/Radiological Explosive 4) WMD THREAT HISTORY Record the total number information for "Number of Threat Incidents" which have occurred in your jurisdiction since January 1, 1998. (Below table is same as Table 2-b-5.) WMD Threat/Incident History (January 1, 1998 to present) Threatened WMD Hazard Total Number of Terrorist Threat Incidents Number of Terrorist Threat Incidents Determined to be Hoaxes Biological Nuclear/Radiological Incendiary Chemical Explosive Total # Table 2-b-7 5) JURISDICTION THREAT RATING Utilizing Table 2-b-4, select the highest threat level obtained of all PTEs identified within your jurisdiction. Record this number in the right hand portion of Table 2- b-8, below. This number represents your jurisdiction's highest threat level. This is the Jurisdiction Threat Rating and will be used in Task D to determine the Jurisdiction Risk Rating, i.e., a combination of threat and vulnerability. Jurisdiction Threat Rating Table 2-b-8 Section 2, Tab c Task C: Public Health Performance Assessment Instrument for Emergency Preparedness DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES Public Health Service Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Atlanta, GA 30333 Dear Colleague, October 4, 1999 The attached Public Health Assessment Instrument for Public Health Preparedness will assist you in determining the ability of your State and/or Local Public Health System to rapidly and effectively respond to biological and chemical agents, as well as other acute public health emergencies. This instrument was developed as a collaborative effort of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers For Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); the National Public Health Performance Standards Program, Public Health Practice Program Office, CDC; and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch, National Center For Environmental Health, CDC; with the full collaboration of other CDC Centers, Institutes and Offices having public health bioterrorism preparedness and response responsibilities. Our public health constituency partners at the national, state, and local levels include the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). They have all been actively involved in the development of this tool and implementation plan. In addition, this instrument is part of a Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice national project to develop an integrated statewide assessment of emergency response activities. The Department of Justice requested assistance from CDC to include a public health component for this overall survey instrument. We believe that this will be is an excellent opportunity for you to determine your public health system's capability to respond. We strongly encourage you to complete this assessment in your local jurisdictions following the regional training sessions (to be held over the next few months by the Department of Justice and their assessment partners). Your inputs and feedback will be invaluable. CDC and its public health partners look forward to working with you as we collaborate to improve our nation's public health capacity to respond to the threat of bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. Sincerely, Scott R. Lillibridge, M.D. Director, Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program (Proposed) Office of the Director National Center for Infectious Diseases Paul Halverson, Dr.P.H. Director, National Public Health Performance Standards Program Deputy Director, Division of Public Health Systems Public Health Practice Program Office Public Health Performance Assessment - Emergency Preparedness A. Public Health and the Department of Justice Assessment Process In order to assess the baseline of readiness to respond to the threat of biological, chemical and radiological emergencies, CDC, in collaboration with public health partners has developed the attached public health emergency preparedness assessment instrument. This tool is integrated with the threat assessment tool developed by the FBI and the risk, capabilities, and needs assessment instruments developed for the US Department of Justice. These instruments together form an integrated assessment instrument for state and local jurisdictions. The public health assessment is organized according to the ten essential services of public health which were developed in 1994 by representatives of ASTHO, NACCHO, the Institute of Medicine, the Association of Schools of Public Health, the Public Health Foundation, the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors, and the U.S. Public Health Service (http://web.health.gov/phfunctions/public.htm). The terms local public health system (LPHS) and local public health agency (LPHA) are used frequently in the assessment. The local public health system (LPHS) is the collection of public and private organizations contributing to public health at the local level. In some cases, organizations headquartered outside the local jurisdiction may be included in the LPHS if these organizations contribute to public health at the local level. The contribution need not be permanent or ongoing, so long as it contributes to public health at the local level. Components of the LPHS may include: Governmental entities--including local public health agency (LPHA) or department, board of health, local or regional branch of state health department bearing responsibility for the delivery of any public health service to the jurisdiction Hospitals serving the jurisdiction Managed care organizations serving the jurisdiction Clinics and physicians serving the jurisdiction Social service providers Civic organizations providing public health services to the jurisdiction Professional organizations providing public health services to the jurisdiction Local businesses providing public health services to the jurisdiction Neighborhood organizations providing public health services to the jurisdiction Faith institutions providing public health services to the jurisdiction Transportation providers providing public health services to the jurisdiction Educational institutions providing public health services to the jurisdiction Public safety and emergency response agencies and organizations Environmental or environmental-health agencies Non-profit organizations/advocacy groups providing public health services to the jurisdiction The local public health agency (LPHA) may vary in different jurisdictions, but usually includes the local health department, local board of health, and/or other local governmental entity designed to provide public health services to the jurisdiction. In many communities, the LPHA is one of many participants--although a major player--in the LPHS. The State may provide services, which comprise a part of the local public health system. These concepts should be discussed by the team that will complete the assessment instrument. B. Completing the Assessment 1. Defining the jurisdiction - The jurisdiction under assessment may be a city, a county, multiple counties, a metropolitan area or a region. All are acceptable for assessment purposes. To facilitate analysis, please provide a list of all geographic areas included in the surveyed jurisdiction. 2. Identifying the team of respondents - A single person or organization will not be able to adequately complete the assessment. During pilot testing, the instrument was best completed when the head of the local public health agency assembled a team from the LPHS who represented the range of services required to respond to public health emergencies. As guidance, we highly recommend that representatives from: the local public health agencies, hospitals, emergency medical services; fire department, law enforcement, media and others involved in local emergency planning, be involved in the completion of the assessment. Page three of the assessment instrument contains a sign-up sheet for those person participating in the assessment. 3. Answering the questions We have tried to make all questions answerable with a definite YES or NO. However, there will be certain questions that respondents may be uncertain how to answer. Respondents should answer YES to any question that is partially met. C. Overview of Capabilities of Local Public Health Jurisdiction The set of questions on page 35 titled 'Overview of Capabilities of Local Public Health Jurisdiction@ are a set of consensus indicators frequently used for measuring community- level public health capacity. Because these indicators have been used in prior assessments of public health performance, completing this survey in addition to the public health emergency preparedness assessment instrument will contribute to the science-base of performance measurement in public health practice. Performance Assessment Public Health Emergency Preparedness Demographic Inventory This should be completed by staff of the local public health agency or agencies being assessed Assessment Completion Date: Name of Health Agency Coordinating Completion of Assessment: Mailing Address: City: State: Zip Code: Telephone: FAX: Web site or email address: Public Health Agency Director Coordinating Completion of Assessment: Title: Degree(s): Email Address: Telephone: Pager: Cell Phone: Emergency Response Representative Coordinating Completion of Assessment: Title: Degree(s): Email Address: Telephone: Pager: Cell Phone: Person in charge of completing and submitting this assessment to the statewide coordinator: Title: Email Address: Telephone: Categorize your jurisdiction by selecting one of the following, or describe its structure under "other": o County o City/Municipal o City/County o District o Regional o State o Other (Specify): For purposes of identifying the coverage area for this assessment, please list the geographic area(s) included in this assessment e.g. Henry County. Geographic area can include one or more counties, township, individual city or town. (If more than one county is included, please list all counties.) If the description of your jurisdiction is NOT a county, city, or multiple counties, please list ALL zip codes for the geographical area the assessment covers. What is the most recent population of the jurisdiction reported in this assessment? Population Mo./Yr. / Total number of employees working in the local public health agency (or agencies) being reported this assessment Number by Category Full time employees Contractual Part time Other Total Employees Public Health Emergency Preparedness Assessment Team Please list all persons who contributed to this assessment* Name Jurisdiction Represented Job Area of Expertise Phone Email Address 1. (Facilitator) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12. 13 14 15 *NOTE: Can use hyperlink to a list. Overview of Capabilities of Local Public Health Jurisdiction 1. For the jurisdiction served by your local health department, is there a community needs assessment process that systematically describes the prevailing health status in the community? Yes o No o 2. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency surveyed the population for behavioral risk factors? Yes o No o 3. For the jurisdiction served by your local health agency, are timely investigations of adverse health events, including communicable disease outbreaks and environmental health hazards, conducted on an ongoing basis? Yes o No o 4. Are the necessary laboratory services available to the local public health agency to support investigations of adverse health events and that meet routine diagnostic and surveillance needs? Yes o No o 5. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, has an analysis been completed of the determinants and contributing factors of priority health needs, adequacy of existing health resources, and the population groups most impacted? Yes o No o 6. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency conducted an analysis of age-specific participation in preventive and screening services? Yes o No o 7. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, is there a network of support and communication relationships that includes health-related organizations, the media, and the general public? Yes o No o 8. In the past year in your jurisdiction, has there been a formal attempt by the local public health agency at informing elected officials about the potential public health impact of decisions under their consideration? Yes o No o 9. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, has there been a prioritization of the community health needs that have been identified from a community needs assessment? Yes o No o 10. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency implemented community health initiatives consistent with established priorities? Yes o No o 11. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, has a community health action plan been developed with community participation to address community health needs? Yes o No o 12. During the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency developed plans to allocate resources in a manner consistent with community health action plans? Yes o No o 13. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, have resources been deployed as necessary to address priority health needs identified in the community health needs assessment? Yes o No o 14. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency conducted an organizational self-assessment? Yes o No o 15. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, are age-specific priority health needs effectively addressed through the provision of, or linkage to appropriate services? Yes o No o 16. Within the past year in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency provided reports to the media on a regular basis? Yes o No o 17. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, have there been regular evaluations of the effects of public health services on community health status? Yes o No o 18. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health agency used professionally recognized processes and outcome measures to monitor programs and to redirect resources as appropriate? Yes o No o 19. In your jurisdiction, is the public regularly provided with information about current health status, health care needs, positive health behaviors, and health care policy issues? Yes o No o 20. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has there been an instance in which the local public health agency has failed to implement a mandated program or service? Yes o No o Essential Service #1: Monitor health status to identify community health problems 1.1 Indicator: Monitoring for Rapid detection 1.1.1 Does the LPHS monitor community and health indicators which may signal biological, chemical and/or radiological incidents? Yes o No o DK o DK = Don't know If yes, how frequently are the following rates monitored: Daily (D) Weekly (W) Monthly (M) Other Freq (O) Not at all (No) Don't Know (DK) 1.1.1.1 Hospital admission D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.2 ICU occupancy D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.3 Unexplained deaths (including medical examiner/coroner cases) D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.4 Unusual syndromes in ambulatory patients D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.5 Influenza-like illness D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.6 Ambulance runs D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.7 911 calls D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.8 Poison control centers calls D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.9 Pharmaceutical demand (antimicrobial agent usage, etc.) D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.10 Emergency department utilization D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.11 Outpatient department utilization D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.12 Absenteeism in large worksites D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.13 Absenteeism in schools D o W o M o O o No o DK o 1.1.1.14 Others (specify) 1.2 Indicator: Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 1.2.1 Does the LPHS perform, or have access to, hazard assessments of the facilities within its jurisdiction? If yes, are hazards at the following facilities assessed: Yes o No o DK o 1.2.1.1 Academic institution and other laboratories Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.2 Agriculture co-op facilities Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.3 Chemical manufacturing and storage Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.4 Dams, levies, and other flood control mechanisms Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.5 Facilities for storage of infectious waste Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.6 Firework factories Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units & Reserves) Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel processing facilities Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes o No o DK o NA o 1.2.1.17 Others (Specify) __________________________________ Essential Service #2: Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the community 2.1 Indicator: Information System Capacity Some questions in Section 2.1 apply to the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) for your LPHA. This is the person who would lead the local health department's effort in the event of a bioterrorism incident (e.g. health officer, LHD Director, environmental health director, etc.). The actual title of this person will vary from locality to locality. 2.1.1 Does the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) have a computer at work (e.g. primary or exclusive use of computer)? If yes, Yes o No o DK o 2.1.1.1 Does the ERC have a CD-ROM reader? Yes o No o DK o 2.1.1.2 Does the ERC have internet e-mail? If yes, Yes o No o DK o 2.1.1.